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Abstract 
Is the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change destined to succeed or doomed to fail? If all the pledges embedded in 
the intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) are implemented fully, temperatures at the Earth’s surface 
are predicted to rise by 3–4 °C, far above the agreement’s goal of limiting increases to 1.5 °C. This means that the fate 
of the agreement will be determined by the success of efforts to strengthen or ratchet up the commitments contained 
in the national pledges over time. The first substantive section of this essay provides a general account of mechanisms 
for ratcheting up commitments and conditions determining the use of these mechanisms in international environmen-
tal agreements. The second section applies this analysis to the specific case of the Paris Agreement. The conclusion is 
mixed. There are plenty of reasons to doubt whether the Paris Agreement will succeed in moving from strength to 
strength in a fashion resembling experience with the Montreal Protocol on ozone depleting substances. Nevertheless, 
there is more room for hope in this regard than those who see the climate problem as unusually malign, wicked, or 
even diabolical are willing to acknowledge. 
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1. Introduction 
Opinions differ sharply regarding the fate of the 
agreement on climate change adopted on 12 Decem-
ber 2015 at the close of the Conference of the Parties 
to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC COP 21) in Paris (UNFCCC, 2015). Those who 
are optimistic about the Paris Agreement point to: (i) 
the explicit reference to the desirability of limiting 
temperature increases to 1.5 °C, (ii) the inclusion of In-
tended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) 
for most countries rather than just those developed 
countries listed in Annex 1 of the UNFCCC, (iii) the legal 
character of the agreement, and (iv) the commitment 
to review pledges periodically with a view toward 
strengthening them over time. Pessimists, by contrast, 
note that (i) national INDCs are often vague, highly as-
pirational, and fundamentally unenforceable, (ii) the 
provisions dealing with monitoring, reporting, and veri-
fication are far from watertight, (iii) the mechanism re-
garding support for developing countries is underde-
veloped, and (iv) the agreement lacks explicit 
compliance mechanisms. So, the question is: Does the 
Paris Agreement represent a major step forward by 
comparison with the outcome of COP 15 in 2009 or is 
this new agreement simply the Copenhagen Accord re-
dux or, worse yet, Copenhagen lite? 
There is one thing we can say with certainty. The 
national pledges that countries have made in the INDCs 
they submitted in preparation for the Paris negotia-
tions are not sufficient to prevent a rise in tempera-
tures at the Earth’s surface beyond 2 °C, much less be-
yond 1.5 °C, even if all parties implement their pledges 
fully and faithfully. Even optimistic assessments of the 
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pledges conclude that their fulfillment would lead to 
temperature increases on the order of 3.5 °C (see Fig-
ure 1). This means that the critical determinant of the 
success of the Paris Agreement will be whether the 
agreement sets in motion a process that leads step-by-
step and sooner rather than later to what analysts de-
scribe as a ratcheting up of the pledges embedded in 
the INDCs. Realistically, to achieve the target articulat-
ed in Art. 2(1) of the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015), 
the major emitters (China, the United States, the Euro-
pean Union, India) would need to raise their pledges to 
reduce emissions substantially or, in some cases, to 
commit to making serious reductions by 2025 or by 
2030 at the latest. At the same time, other countries 
(especially important ones like Brazil, Indonesia, Japan, 
and Russia) would need to avoid taking steps that 
would exacerbate the problem. Is this within the realm 
of the possible? 
In this article, I take up this question and examine it 
from several angles. I start by identifying the mecha-
nisms through which the commitments of individual 
members of international regimes can be strength-
ened. I then consider the conditions likely to determine 
the success or failure of efforts to make use of these 
mechanisms to strengthen international commitments 
in specific cases. With the insights generated from this 
analysis in hand, I turn to the question of whether the 
Paris Agreement is destined to succeed or doomed to 
fail. In assessing the link between general observations 
about ratcheting up international commitments and 
the specific case of the climate regime, I draw on a 
number of lines of analysis, including several argu-
ments that Arild Underdal has played a key role in de-
veloping over the course of his career (Underdal, 2002, 
2008, 2010). In conclusion, I offer a tentative response 
to the question posed in the article’s title. 
2. Strengthening International Regimes: Mechanisms 
and Conditions 
International regimes commonly (perhaps even typical-
ly) start out as relatively modest arrangements that do 
not make demands on their members that will prove 
difficult to implement. Some go from strength to 
strength, adopting more ambitious commitments and 
becoming increasingly effective over time. But others 
do not grow stronger with the passage of time. The 
Montreal Protocol on ozone-depleting substances 
(ODSs), often thought of as the gold standard in these 
terms, has been able to ratchet up commitments both 
by accelerating phaseout schedules for those chemicals 
already covered and by adding more chemicals to the 
list of those covered under the terms of the agreement 
(Andersen & Sarma, 2002; Parson, 2003). Although the
 
Figure 1. Temperature increases as a function of greenhouse gas emissions. Source: ClimateInteractive 
(www.climateinteractive.org/tools/scoreboard). 
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stratospheric ozone layer still shows signs of the im-
pacts of ODSs, the problem of ozone depletion is well 
on its way to being solved. By contrast, few if any coun-
tries were prepared to ratchet up their commitments 
to reducing greenhouse gas emissions under the terms 
of the Kyoto Protocol at the close of the first commit-
ment period in 2012. Several parties had withdrawn 
from the protocol entirely; those that remained were in 
no mood to accept more stringent reduction targets. 
This suggests that the trick is to craft arrangements al-
lowing for step-by-step strengthening of initial commit-
ments and to muster the political will needed to make 
use of these procedures effectively. This leads to a re-
view of various mechanisms that can play this role fol-
lowed by an examination of the conditions governing 
success in efforts to make use of these mechanisms. 
2.1. Mechanisms 
There are a number of distinct mechanisms that can 
produce a progressive dynamic regarding the strength 
of commitments embedded in international govern-
ance systems. Not all regimes are alike in this regard. 
The relevance of specific mechanisms depends both on 
the nature of the problem at stake and the general 
character of the regime created to deal with it. In the 
final analysis, individual cases must be considered on 
their own terms. Nevertheless, some concrete exam-
ples will serve to provide an overview of the range of 
mechanisms available in this context. 
One of the simplest mechanisms for ratcheting up 
commitments is to grant authority to the confer-
ence/meeting of the parties to amend existing provi-
sions without requiring formal ratification on the part 
of the member states. Under the 1987 Montreal Proto-
col on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, for 
example, the Meeting of the Parties has acted repeat-
edly to accelerate phaseout schedules for individual 
ODSs, as it has become clear that more ambitious goals 
have entered the realm of what is economically and 
politically feasible. Similarly, the International Maritime 
Organization, acting as the agency responsible for the 
1973/1978 International Convention for the Prevention 
of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), can make decisions 
involving amendments to the convention’s annexes 
dealing with various types of discharges (e.g. noxious 
substances, sewage, garbage). These decisions are as-
sumed to become legally binding on member states that 
do not object to them within a specified period of time.  
Another mechanism involves adding chemicals or 
other substances to the list of those banned or con-
trolled under the terms of an international regime. 
Adding new families of chemicals to the list of those 
scheduled for phaseout under the Montreal Protocol, 
for instance, requires not only a decision on the part of 
the MOP but also acceptance on the part of member 
states. This is a more stringent requirement. But it 
need not be a barrier to strengthening commitments. 
The Montreal Protocol now covers almost 100 hazard-
ous chemicals. A similar mechanism occurs in the case 
of the 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Or-
ganic Pollutants. At the outset, the convention focused 
on banning or limiting the use of the so-called “dirty 
dozen” (e.g. chlordane, dieldrin, heptachlor). But there 
are thousands of industrial chemicals that belong to 
the category of persistent organic pollutants (POPs); 
more are being developed all the time. The convention 
sets up a Persistent Organic Pollutants Review Commit-
tee to make recommendations to the parties regarding 
the elimination or regulation of additional POPs. In fact, 
the parties have added chemicals to the list of regulated 
POPs on several occasions, though this has proved to be 
a complex and difficult mechanism to use successfully 
under the terms of the Stockholm Convention. 
A different mechanism comes into play where the 
parties initially establish a framework convention that 
becomes a constitutive platform on which to develop 
protocols dealing with a variety of more specific con-
cerns. A prominent case is the 1979 Geneva Conven-
tion on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution 
(LRTAP). Operating under the auspices of the UN Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe, LRTAP has spawned 
seven protocols dealing initially with key pollutants like 
sulfur and nitrogen but expanding over time to encom-
pass a range of additional pollutants including volatile 
organic compounds, heavy metals, and persistent or-
ganic pollutants. While this mechanism requires parties 
to agree to individual protocols on a case-by-case basis, 
it has the virtue of allowing parties to make progress in 
dealing with specific pollutants without renegotiating 
constitutive or foundational arrangements or waiting 
until the member states are prepared to agree on the 
terms of measures dealing with a sizable collection of 
pollutants taken together. 
Yet another mechanism for strengthening commit-
ments occurs in regimes that establish procedures for 
setting quotas or allowable harvest levels for harvest-
ing of living resources. What is known as the schedule 
under the 1946 International Convention for the Regu-
lation of Whaling provides a prominent example. In the 
early years, the parties adopted relatively high annual 
quotas to avoid forceful opposition on the part of key 
whaling states, despite the objections of both scientists 
and environmentalists concerned about declining 
stocks of great whales. Over time, however, the Inter-
national Whaling Commission took decisions to lower 
the quotas step-by-step. In 1982, the commission 
adopted a moratorium on whaling by setting the quo-
tas for individual species at zero. Initially presented as 
an arrangement that would last for ten years, the 
commission has never been able to muster the three-
fourths majority required to reach agreement on the 
replacement of the moratorium with some alternative 
system for setting quotas. In effect, this mechanism in-
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volves a process of ratcheting down quotas in contrast 
to the effort to ratchet up commitments in the context 
of regimes dealing with air pollution. 
A mechanism that is often deployed in conjunction 
with other mechanisms centers on the provision of fi-
nancial assistance to member states that agree to 
strengthen their commitments under the terms of a 
particular regime. Financial arrangements may be em-
bedded within the provisions of individual regimes or 
take the form of external mechanisms that can provide 
assistance to those willing to strengthen their com-
mitments under a particular regime. A prominent ex-
ample of the first option is the Montreal Protocol Mul-
tilateral Fund, added to the regime under the terms of 
a 1990 amendment as a means of helping developing 
countries (known as Art. 5 parties) to shift to non-ODSs 
or to pursue development without relying on ODSs. 
The Global Environment Facility (GEF) provides an ex-
ample of the second option. The GEF is a separate body 
sponsored jointly by the UN Development Programme, 
the UN Environment Programme, and the World Bank. 
The Facility serves as a financial mechanism for a num-
ber of conventions, including the 1992 Convention on 
Biological Diversity, the 1995 Convention to Combat 
Desertification, and the 2013 Minamata Convention on 
Mercury as well as the UNFCCC and the Stockholm 
Convention. The point of this mechanism is to 
strengthen commitments associated with specific re-
gimes by providing ways to alleviate financial problems 
that may make it hard for parties to live up to com-
mitments they have made or to accept new commit-
ments regarding specific problems.  
2.2. Conditions 
Thus, numerous mechanisms are available to those 
seeking to strengthen commitments embedded in in-
ternational regimes. The selection of a mechanism for 
strengthening commitments in a specific case will de-
pend on the character of the regime in question. Ac-
celerating phaseout schedules for individual chemicals 
is one thing; reducing quotas for harvested species is 
another. At the same time, it is important to note that 
the selection of a suitable mechanism for strengthen-
ing commitments does not guarantee success. Some 
international environmental regimes do make a signifi-
cant contribution to problem solving (Underdal, 2008). 
Although many observers regard the ozone regime as 
the gold standard in these terms, there are other suc-
cess stories, including the Antarctic Treaty System and 
the combination of agreements dedicated to cleaning 
up the Rhine River. Still, governance failure is common 
in this realm. Even in the case of ozone, drastic reduc-
tions in the production and consumption of ODSs have 
yet to eliminate annual ozone holes, particularly in the 
high latitudes. 
This makes it essential to think about conditions 
likely to determine the success or failure of efforts to 
make use of strengthening mechanisms in connection 
with specific regimes. What is it that produces success in 
ratcheting up commitments in some regimes but failure 
in other cases? Clearly, complex causality is the order of 
the day in this context. Numerous conditions, typically 
interacting with one another, come into play in deter-
mining outcomes in specific cases. Even so, it is possible 
to identify some key conditions that are relevant to ef-
forts to strengthen a variety of specific regimes. 
Regimes may incorporate provisions automatically 
strengthening commitments over the course of time. 
An agreement calling for additional reductions in a giv-
en pollutant every five or ten years in the absence of a 
decision to the contrary, for instance, exemplifies this 
possibility. But at the international level, there are few 
examples of arrangements of this sort. The course of 
least resistance is almost always to maintain the status 
quo until and unless an explicit decision is taken to 
strengthen existing commitments. This creates a bias 
against the operation of the sorts of mechanisms de-
scribed in the preceding subsection. Policy agendas are 
always crowded, and political capital is limited (King-
don, 1995). Once a concerted effort is made to estab-
lish specific commitments to address a given problem, 
there is a natural tendency for policymakers to move 
on to address other issues clamoring for attention on 
relevant policy agendas. Nevertheless, ratcheting up 
does occur in some cases. So, the question becomes: 
What does it take to overcome the force of inertia or 
path dependence in situations of this sort? Are there 
specific conditions that are sufficient to overcome this 
natural tendency toward stasis? 
One prominent example centers on the configura-
tion of the interests of a regime’s member states. In 
cases where there are clear asymmetries in the sense 
that some members stand to benefit from strengthen-
ing commitments while others expect to lose, any ef-
fort to ratchet up initial commitments will prove diffi-
cult, requiring hard bargaining at a minimum. Even in 
cases where all parties can expect to benefit from 
ratcheting up commitments, what Underdal has de-
scribed as the law of the least ambitious program may 
make progress slow (Underdal, 1981). That is, it is hard 
to proceed more quickly than those who are reluctant 
to embrace new commitments are willing to move. In 
real world cases, things are apt to become considerably 
more complex. Individual members may benefit from 
the implementation of some features of a regime, 
while losing from the implementation of others. Uncer-
tainty may make it difficult to determine the incidence 
of benefits and costs, a factor that leaves a lot of room 
for the application of competing but untestable narra-
tives or ideologies on the part of those responsible for 
ratcheting up commitments. Vigorous debates regard-
ing such matters may occur among policymakers within 
individual regime members. In situations of this kind, 
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seemingly authoritative reports about the impacts of a 
particular problem can have a big impact. Reports re-
garding the probable health impacts of the loss of 
stratospheric ozone appearing during the mid-1980s, 
for example, had a dramatic effect on the negotiations 
leading initially to agreement on the terms of the 1987 
Montreal Protocol and subsequently to agreement on 
amendments accelerating phaseout schedules for a va-
riety of ODSs. Current reports documenting the health 
impacts of the airborne particulates known as PM2.5, 
especially in major players like China, may play a paral-
lel role in the ongoing debates about efforts to control 
severe air pollution. 
Beyond this lies the influence of particularly influ-
ential actors or what we can think of as “veto players” 
located or based within individual member states. In 
the case of ozone depletion, the decision by DuPont, 
an American chemical company that produced ODSs 
accounting for some 25% of the global market in the 
mid-1980s, to become an active supporter of phasing 
out many chlorofluorocarbons and halons made a big 
difference in efforts to accelerate phaseout schedules 
under the terms of the Montreal Protocol. Conversely, 
veto players may emerge as entrenched sources of op-
position to efforts to strengthen national commitments 
under the terms of specific regimes, especially in cases 
where such players are in a position to exercise direct 
influence over policymaking processes at the national 
level. The example of the coal industry is particularly 
interesting in this connection. Whereas there is some 
reason to believe that the industry is losing strength as 
a veto player in China, it is hard to find evidence of 
such a decline in the United States. The US Supreme 
Court’s unprecedented February 2016 order suspend-
ing the implementation of the regulations associated 
with President Obama’s Clean Power Plan pending a fi-
nal determination regarding the legality of these regu-
lations is a striking indicator of the ability of the coal 
industry to wield influence over the American policy-
making process (Liptak & Davenport, 2016). 
Shifts in the fortunes of relevant industries may al-
so affect efforts to strengthen commitments regarding 
specific environmental problems. In 1946 at the time of 
the negotiation of the International Convention for the 
Regulation of Whaling, for example, most member 
states had an active and influential whaling industry. 
But with the passage of time, substitutes for whale 
products developed for most uses, and whaling be-
came a dying industry. By 1982, when the International 
Whaling Commission adopted the moratorium on har-
vesting great whales, many key states (e.g. Australia, 
the Netherlands, the UK, the US) no longer had active 
whaling industries. Today, even the Japanese whaling 
industry is a vestige of its former self, though the gov-
ernment of Japan continues to fight a rearguard action 
against anti-whaling forces. Whale-watching, a new in-
dustry that has a powerful interest in keeping whales 
alive, has become increasingly influential in many of 
the regime’s member states. Under the circumstances, 
the 1982 decision to strengthen commitments by set-
ting quotas to zero was much easier in political terms 
than it would have been in earlier times. Interestingly, 
the three-fourths decision rule has served as an effec-
tive barrier to the success of efforts to reverse or 
amend the 1982 decision. The case of whaling is un-
doubtedly an extreme example. But it is not unique. 
Shifts in the structure of those industries that have ma-
jor stakes in the concerns of specific regimes can play a 
key role in determining the fate of efforts to strength-
en commitments. 
Another condition centers on the magnitude and 
the incidence of the costs involved in taking the actions 
required to solve the problems that regimes address. 
Costs are difficult both to calculate in advance and to 
document over time. But a common occurrence in this 
context is that the actual costs of solving environmen-
tal problems turn out to be a fraction of the costs pro-
jected by opponents during the negotiations leading to 
the creation of regimes in the first place. This is partly a 
matter of the politics of environmental negotiations. 
Those who are opposed to the creation of a regime 
regularly exaggerate the costs that will be involved in 
efforts to implement the terms of a proposed agree-
ment. In part, however, it is a matter of technological 
innovation. Once a regime is in place and those whose 
actions are affected focus their attention on the pro-
cess of implementation, innovations begin to emerge 
that make compliance with the terms of a regime less 
costly than initially expected. Once again, the ozone 
regime provides a clearcut example. Not only did pro-
ducers find affordable alternatives for many uses of 
ODSs; the alternatives sometimes turned out to be 
more cost effective than the chemicals they replaced. 
When this occurs, it becomes easier, sometimes dra-
matically easier, to strengthen commitments that had 
been the subject of hard bargaining at the outset. 
Another condition that comes into play in some set-
tings involves the content, intensity, and arousal of 
public concern. Sometimes this is a matter of more or 
less far-reaching shifts in public attitudes and values. It 
is hard to deny, for example, that a broad swath of the 
public has come to accept the proposition that non-
human species are sentient beings endowed with a 
right to life, a normative position that complicates the 
situation of industries that are predicated on the con-
sumptive use of animals. Obviously, there are limits to 
this line of thinking; no one advocates acknowledging a 
right to life for disease-bearing insects. But in the cases 
of charismatic megafauna (e.g. elephants, polar bears, 
whales), shifting public attitudes have played an im-
portant role in strengthening the arguments of those 
favoring the tightening of the rules embedded in re-
gimes dedicated to the conservation of wildlife (Safina, 
2015). In extreme cases, the force of this development 
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has triggered a shift from conservation (e.g. achieving 
maximum sustainable yields on an ongoing basis) to 
preservation (e.g. minimizing all intentional killing of 
individual members of key species) as the fundamental 
goal of relevant regimes.  
In other cases, the role of public attitudes is more a 
matter of framing issues in such a way as to tap into in-
tense concerns that can lead to the mobilization of 
public interest in an issue and the growth of pressure on 
policymakers to take action to address specific prob-
lems. In many societies, success in framing an issue as a 
matter of public health can have this effect. Turning to 
the example of ozone depletion again, it is hard to over-
estimate the importance of the specter of a dramatic 
rise in the incidence of melanomas and glaucoma arising 
from increased exposure to solar radiation caused by the 
seasonal thinning of the stratospheric ozone layer. Bal-
anced assessments of benefits and costs may or may not 
favor the case of those calling for the ratcheting up of 
commitments that lie at the heart of environmental re-
gimes. But success in framing issues in ways that activate 
deeply held and intense public concerns can make a crit-
ical difference to the outcome of efforts to strengthen 
commitments embedded in specific regimes. 
Cutting across these concerns is the role of leader-
ship or what some analysts refer to as championship as 
a condition affecting efforts to strengthen the com-
mitments of environmental regimes (Litfin, 1994). 
Leadership can take a number of forms (Young, 1991). 
Intellectual leadership is a matter of creativity in find-
ing new and effective ways to characterize a problem. 
Entrepreneurial leadership involves the ability to put 
together coalitions of the willing to support the 
strengthening of international commitments. Structur-
al leadership centers on the capacity to bring to bear 
material resources (e.g. financial assistance or rewards) 
in a manner that helps to persuade reluctant parties to 
join coalitions supporting the strengthening of com-
mitments. In all its forms, leadership can be idiosyn-
cratic. It is hard to forecast the emergence of effective 
leaders in a given issue area, much less to predict 
whether their efforts will succeed in bringing about ma-
jor advances in the strength of commitments in specific 
cases. Nevertheless, case studies show repeatedly that 
leaders play key roles with regard to the evolution of 
those regimes that do become stronger with regard to 
the content and extent of their commitments. 
It is easy to identify synergies regarding the opera-
tion of many of these conditions. When relative sym-
metry in the interests of member states is combined 
with veto players willing to engage actively in problem-
solving behavior and with technological advances that 
lower the costs of addressing a problem significantly, 
for example, there are good reasons to be optimistic. If 
effective leadership emerges in such cases, there is all 
the more reason to anticipate success. A combination 
of this sort accounts for the success of the ozone re-
gime, widely regarded as the preeminent example 
when it comes to the progressive development of 
stronger commitments needed to solve a major inter-
national problem.  
3. Strengthening the Paris Agreement 
Many observers regard the problem of climate change 
as particularly intractable in these terms. They see cli-
mate change as what Underdal and his colleagues have 
called a malign problem and what others have charac-
terized as a wicked or diabolical problem that does not 
lend itself to progress in the form of strengthening 
commitments over time (Miles et al., 2002; Steffen, 
2011). But this intuitively appealing assessment needs 
to be subjected to critical evaluation. What light does 
the preceding section’s analysis of mechanisms and 
conditions shed on prospects for strengthening inter-
national commitments regarding climate and, more 
specifically, on the likely fate of the Paris Agreement? 
The mechanisms for strengthening commitments 
embedded in the Paris Agreement are considerably 
less straightforward than those described in the pre-
ceding section. Strengthening must take the form, first 
and foremost, of ratcheting up the commitments artic-
ulated in the INDCs. But this is hardly a matter of simp-
ly accelerating phaseout schedules as in the case of 
ozone depletion, adding chemicals to the proscribed 
list as in the case of persistent organic pollutants, or 
changing quotas as in the case of whaling. There is no 
common currency underlying the INDCs as formulated 
by individual countries. Each country has formulated its 
INDC in its own terms. Even in cases where they refer 
to quantified reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions, there are different base years and different 
procedures for measuring or verifying progress. 
Whereas the European Union has pledged to reduce 
domestic emissions across the full set of 28 member 
countries by 40% relative to the base year of 1990 by 
2030, for example, the United States has promised to 
reduce emissions by 26–28% relative to the base year 
of 2005 by 2025. And some of the INDCs are not for-
mulated in terms of quantified reductions at all. China, 
for instance, has pledged to reach peak GHG emissions 
no later than 2030, to make a good faith effort to begin 
to reduce emissions sooner, and, in the meantime, to 
reduce the carbon intensity of goods and services by 
60–65% relative to 2005 by 2030. India has promised 
to lower energy intensity by 33–35% relative to 2005 
by 2030 and to increase the proportion of non-fossil 
fuel based power generation to 40% by 2030. Under 
the circumstances, strengthening the INDCs would 
amount to a collection of national formulas that would 
not be easy to evaluate in aggregate terms. 
A second mechanism for strengthening commit-
ments embedded in the Paris Agreement involves the 
provision of funding to help developing countries to 
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find ways to grow their economies without increasing 
emissions of GHGs and to adapt to the impacts of cli-
mate change. But here, too, it is difficult to understand 
exactly what the strengthening of commitments would 
entail. In some respects, the terms of the Paris Agree-
ment regarding funding backtrack from the commit-
ments articulated in the 2009 Copenhagen Accord. In 
Copenhagen, the parties pledged to mobilize new and 
additional funding approaching $30 billion during 
2010–2012 and to make an effort to raise this to $100 
billion per year by 2020. By contrast, the Paris Agree-
ment says simply that “[d]eveloped country Parties 
shall provide financial resources to assist developing 
country Parties with respect to both mitigation and ad-
aptation in continuation of their existing obligations 
under the Convention” (Art. 9.1). The developed coun-
tries are clearly expected to increase their contribu-
tions along these lines over time. But because there is 
no explicit baseline regarding the scale of these contri-
butions, it is difficult to say what a strengthening of the 
commitments regarding funding would entail.  
One way to think about the Paris Agreement is to 
treat it as a system of pledge and review. The parties 
agree to engage in what the agreement describes as a 
“global stocktake” from time to time in order “to as-
sess collective progress towards achieving the purpose 
of this Agreement” with the intention of strengthening 
their commitments as needed to fulfill the goals of the 
agreement (Art. 14). They plan to “undertake the first 
global stocktake in 2023 and every five years thereafter 
unless otherwise decided by the Conference of the Par-
ties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris 
Agreement” (Art. 14.2). Informally, there has been dis-
cussion of accelerating this schedule, carrying out the 
first of these assessments as early as 2020. 
This is a hopeful sign with regard to the prospects 
for strengthening commitments under the Paris 
Agreement. As evidence regarding the reality of cli-
mate change becomes more clearcut and undeniable, 
the parties may realize that they must make a good 
faith effort to strengthen their commitments. Still, it 
would be risky to set too much store by this mecha-
nism. If key countries (e.g. China and the United States) 
take the lead, others may feel an obligation to follow 
suit. But there is nothing mandatory about the pledge 
and review process. Efforts to strengthen the commit-
ments of the Paris Agreement through this process 
could easily break down in mutual recriminations, with 
individual parties accusing each other of bad faith due 
to their failure to take strong stands in favor of 
strengthened commitments needed to fulfill the goal 
of holding temperature increases to 2 °C, much less the 
more demanding goal of holding the line at 1.5 °C. 
What, then, of the conditions that will determine 
whether there is progress toward strengthening the 
Paris commitments during the coming years? Is the 
problem of climate change extremely malign, diaboli-
cal, or super-wicked as many observers have suggest-
ed? The case for answering this question in the affirma-
tive rests on several distinct propositions. Energy de-
rived from fossil fuels is deeply embedded in all aspects 
of industrialized economies. The principal beneficiaries 
of this system (e.g. the coal companies, the multination-
al oil companies) wield enormous power in major politi-
cal systems that allows them to stymie efforts to transi-
tion away from dependence on fossil fuels. The 
character of climate change as a collective-action prob-
lem encourages individual countries to hang back, wait-
ing to see if others will take the lead before adopting 
major steps to address the problem on their own. 
Still, this reasoning is by no means the whole story 
regarding efforts to address the problem of climate 
change. The configuration of national interests relating 
to climate change is not as antithetical to progress as in 
the case of truly asymmetrical situations where one 
party’s gains are matched by another party’s losses. 
Everyone stands to lose from severe changes in the 
Earth’s climate system (though not necessarily to the 
same extent), and everyone stands to benefit from 
maintaining what analysts now call a “safe operating 
space for humanity” (Rockström et al., 2009). As with 
all collective-action problems, it may prove difficult to 
induce key states to act as first movers when it comes 
to reducing GHG emissions. But as the recent collabo-
rative initiatives of China and the United States (to-
gether accounting for over 40% of global emissions) 
suggest, leadership on the part of key states in this 
realm is not beyond the realm of the possible. More 
generally, this may be a case that lends itself to treat-
ment in terms of what Schelling calls a “k group” or a 
like-minded coalition of leading players (Schelling, 
1978). Certainly, a coalition encompassing China, the 
European Union, India, and the United States could put 
the international community on a path toward solving 
the problem of climate change. 
Veto players within individual member states (e.g. 
coal companies, oil companies) are able to exert great 
influence regarding the fate of efforts to take effective 
steps to curb GHG emissions. The political power of the 
coal interests in opposing President Obama’s Clean 
Power Plan, for example, offers a compelling recent il-
lustration of this proposition. But it would be a mistake 
to exaggerate the significance of veto players. It is 
probable that the actual costs of reducing GHG emis-
sions will turn out to be much lower than the projec-
tions made by opponents of current policy initiatives 
(Stern, 2009). Technological innovations are likely to 
prove highly important, and there is every reason to 
expect that many new companies will arise that stand 
to make profits from the production and distribution of 
alternative sources of energy. Firm commitments to 
the reduction of GHG emissions may trigger a dynamic 
under which those who are able to profit from this de-
velopment gain the upper hand. 
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The critical factor may turn out to be shifts in public 
attitudes and values or what some have characterized 
as the rise of a new consciousness regarding human-
environment relations. So long as environmental issues 
in general and climate change in particular remain mat-
ters of marginal concern to broad segments of the pub-
lic in key countries, those who stand to gain from op-
posing serious efforts to reduce GHG emissions are 
likely to be able to maintain a stranglehold over policy 
initiatives needed to make a difference regarding the 
problem of climate change. But an aroused public in a 
few key countries might change this picture dramatical-
ly. How might such a development come about? One 
possibility is some sort of climate shock that jolts wide 
swaths of the public into taking climate change serious-
ly. A less dramatic possibility is the development over 
time of a social movement that succeeds in framing 
climate change in compelling terms (perhaps as a pub-
lic health crisis) and in finding ways to mobilize opinion 
leaders within various strata of the population (McKib-
ben, 2013). Will some such development occur during 
the foreseeable future? It is difficult to provide a 
straightforward answer to this question. But it is well 
within the realm of the possible that what seems like a 
malign or even a wicked or diabolical problem today 
will give way to far-reaching social changes that pro-
duce profound alterations in our understanding of the 
nature of this seemingly intractable problem. 
4. Conclusion: And the Answer Is…? 
So, is the Paris Agreement destined to succeed or 
doomed to fail? The critics of the agreement have a 
strong case. Temperatures at the Earth’s surface have 
already risen by an average of 1 °C. The mechanisms 
for strengthening commitments under the terms of the 
agreement seem ill-defined and weak. As the recent 
experiences of the United States make clear, efforts to 
implement the pledges embedded in the INDCs may 
run into serious roadblocks within individual member 
countries. In many cases, it will not be easy to monitor 
or verify the actual progress of individual countries. 
The review procedure sketched out in the Paris Agree-
ment may prove ineffective. In the absence of a real 
sense of crisis, the global stocktake procedure may 
prove desultory and generally unpersuasive. Thus, it 
would not be surprising if the Paris Agreement be-
comes another in a long list of failed attempts to come 
to terms with the problem of climate change. 
Yet I do not want to end this essay with a simple 
statement that the Paris Agreement is doomed to fail. 
There is no basis for making firm predictions about 
such matters. But in thinking about pathways to suc-
cess for the agreement, I believe we need to differenti-
ate two distinct scenarios. One scenario features a se-
vere climate shock, something far more disruptive than 
hurricanes Katrina or Sandy. Think of events on the or-
der of the disintegration of the Greenland Ice Sheet or 
the shutting down of the thermohaline circulation in 
the North Atlantic as possibilities (Lenton et al., 2008). 
Shocks or crises of this magnitude create rare windows 
of opportunity during which far-reaching changes in in-
stitutional arrangements can occur at what seems like 
lightning speed compared with normal times. Such 
windows do not stay open long, and it is essential to be 
prepared for such opportunities with well-developed 
options that can be put into place quickly. While we 
cannot estimate the probability of a shock of this mag-
nitude occurring in the next decade or two with preci-
sion, I regard this scenario as plausible. It is well worth 
taking seriously in planning for the future. Under the 
right circumstances, the Paris Agreement might thrive 
in the wake of such a crisis. 
The other scenario focuses on the prospects for the 
success of the Paris Agreement in the absence of a se-
vere climate shock. The critical issues here, in my 
judgment, involve efforts to break the political grip of 
the forces of business as usual (and especially the fossil 
fuel industry) and to foster a revolution in public con-
sciousness in which new attitudes and values regarding 
human well-being take hold on a widespread basis. 
Breaking the grip of entrenched industries is difficult. 
But as Oreskes and Conway have shown, it can be done 
(Oreskes & Conway, 2010). Particularly important in 
this regard is the promotion of shifts in underlying per-
spectives and attitudes of the sort that Pope Francis 
has articulated in his 2015 encyclical entitled Laudato 
si’ (Laudato Si, 2015). What is at stake here is the trans-
formation of our vision of the good life rather than the 
selection of one or another policy instrument on the 
basis of calculations of benefits and costs. It is easy to 
become cynical about the prospects for real change in 
situations of this sort. But fundamental shifts of this 
type do occur under some conditions, and it may well 
be that developments of this sort will determine the 
fate of the Paris Agreement.  
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